By Gary Farrow, Danville Historical Society
The events of late fall — early winter had brought the North to a low point. Although the army experienced some success in the West, the war in the Virginia theatre had seen one Northern debacle after another.
The Congress’ Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which was established in 1861 and chaired by Ohio’s Ben Wade, was now looking into the loss at Fredericksburg. Over time the committee had become identified with the Radical Republicans, who were at odds with the administration over the lack of an aggressive war effort.
January 3, 1863 North Star, The Fredericksburg Disaster
The evidence in the report of the committee for investigating the disaster of Fredericksburg fixes definitely the responsibility for the consequences of not crossing the Rappahannock at once. It besides makes revelations that are painful and cannot fail to sink deep into the public mind.
On the 7th or 8th of November General Burnside not only received an order to take command of the Army of the Potomac, but also state to the Commander-in-Chief what he proposed to do with it; and accordingly on the morning of the 9th Gen. Burnside wrote out his plan, which was to make a rapid movement of the army to Fredericksburg, requesting that the supplies he named should be preceded “by a pontoon train large enough to span the Rappahannock twice.”
According [Gen.] Hooker’s evidence, “some one of the party mentioned either Gen. Halleck or Gen. Meigs he did not recollect which — thought that they could have everything ready this side in three days. This was not a private conversation. They said they thought they could have pontoons ready, the stores landed, and everything in readiness to advance in three days, but he (Hooker) thought it was not within the range of human possibility to do that.” All the evidence is to the same point that the understanding was general and explicit that the pontoon train was to be in readiness from Washington.
Feeling uneasy about the pontoons, Gen. Burnside, on the day after his column moved from Warrenton, the 14th, telegraphed to Gen. Woodbury or Major Spaulding, which was the first they ever heard of his wish to have the pontoon train started down to Fredericksburg. The pontoons did not reach Fredericksburg until the 22nd and 23rd of November.
The evidence is equally decided as to the opinions expressed by the Generals as to the consequences of this delay. Gen. Burnside distinctly asserts that they interfered with his plan. Gen. Summer, who was in the advance, says, “if the pontoons had been here on my arrival, or in time for me to have crossed and occupied the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg before the enemy could take them, we should have kept pursuing the enemy off from this line of railroad, keeping it in our own possession, and if we could have not preceded them to Richmond, we could have kept so close to them that they would have had no time to build fortifications;“ and Gen. Franklin says, “if the pontoons had arrived, the probable result would have been that the enemy, as much of it as Gen. Burnside supposed to have been necessary would have crossed the river, driving away the enemy here — perhaps 500 or a 1000 — they would have occupied the very heights which we have since been obliged to attack and that crossing would have been permanent and successful.”
“I would like” this General says, “to impress as firmly upon the Committee as it is impressed on my mind, the fact that this whole disaster has resulted from the delay in the arrival of the pontoon bridges. Whoever is responsible for that delay is responsible for all the disasters which have followed. We were rather astonished when we came down here to find that Gen. Summer had been here for some days and had not received the pontoon bridges. I think it is the main course of the disaster.
These statements speak for themselves and hardly need comment. If they do not fix the responsibility of the terrible disaster at Fredericksburg, on the Government at Washington, then there is no meaning in language.
[Bos. Post]
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Lincoln had recently sacked the Army of Potomac’s popular General McClellan whose default strategy seemed to be “hurry up and wait” putting General Burnside in his place only to fire him after the debacle at Fredericksburg. The North was sullen and frustrated.
January 31, 1863 North Star,The Army — The Situation
The progress of the war for the last twelve months, has been anything but encouraging to the Federal cause. Our readers are acquainted with its history. It has been conducted without that grand success which was anticipated. Our success has not been at all commensurate with the vast number of men enlisted, or the immense pecuniary expense involved. There have evidently been mistakes and blunders somewhere; and the worst feature of the whole is that an attempt is made to shift and shirk the responsibility, and throw it off one upon another.
Another discouraging feature, is the want of all-powerful, concentrated action, at one point — in Virginia for instance — for the opinion of many, our forces have been widely scattered over too extended a field of operations whereas, the rebellion never can receive a stunning blow until the rebel army in the “Old Dominion” is entirely routed. It is not the mere taking of Richmond that is wanted — it is the breaking up and destroying the rebel forces on the Rappahannock and the Potomac that is required. Why not then concentrate all our force in that quarter — and let there be the great and decisive battleground.
Relative to the army of the Potomac, there has been a great deal of vacillating management. We have always feared that the army and its officers were too near the political atmosphere of Washington, to escape the jealousies and rivalries, and dictation of ambitious men. We have ever believed, also, that Gen. McClellan was sacrificed to this spirit of rivalry, and shall so believe, until fully assured to the contrary.
Another deplorable phase of the war, is its mercenary character, among many engaged in it. There is a want of that high toned unselfish patriotism, calculated to unite and combine the army into a body of men activated by an earnest desire to promote, and determined to secure the success of the cause; and there is now added to this feature, that very natural and unpleasant reflection among the troops that they are fighting for the negro, with no prospect, or at least, with no certainty of conquering the rebellion at last.
Military success is what is most wanted, and at this juncture — in fact, it is what has been wanting for the last twelve months — and military successes must take place, if we would secure the cordial and united co-operation of our people in the further prosecution of the war. And our vast army and navy already in the field must be the means for securing these victories. If we fail with the great force now marshaled on the Federal side, where and when shall we again see another such array of military strength!
The work before the army, very recently under Burnside, but now under Hooker is immense. May we not confidently hope and expect that his military genius and the stern valor of his troops will prove adequate to the task. Certainly it would seem as if he must succeed, unless his men are too much dispirited by prior reverses and the present conduct of the war, to give them courage and strength.
“Whoever,” says a contemporary journal, “has talked with clear-headed military men, will find expressed the idea that the first great military success ought to be to scatter the rebel host at Fredericksburg — or rather demoralize and break it up. This host makes the centre of the rebellion — its life and strength. When this is done — work will be done. So long as this is left undone, comparatively little progress is made. May the grand Army of the Potomac be well handled, and this work will be done.”
